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Abstract—The most important challenge in Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs) is the energy constraint. Numerous solutions
have been proposed to alleviate this problem, the most efficient
of which is to cluster the sensor nodes. Although clustering in the
realm of WSNs has widely been explored by researchers, a few
effective mechanisms in grouping the nodes, including coalitional
games, need more attention and research. This motivated us to
employ cooperative games and to propose a Coalitional Game-
Theoretic Clustering (CGTC) algorithm for WSNs. Basically two
kinds of coalitions are formed regarding the location of sensor
nodes, where local parameters play an important role in forming
coalitions. Moreover, the Shapley value is adopted as the solution
concept. The result of simulation confirms the effectiveness of
CGTC in terms of energy efficiency.
Index Terms—Wireless Sensor Networks; Clustering; Game
Theory; Cooperative Games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have emerged
as one of the most notable technologies. WSNs’ applications
are widespread, ranging from military to health-care to smart
cities. Since nodes are battery-operated, the most important
challenge in WSNs is to conserve the energy. Accordingly, re-
searchers have proposed plenty of solutions, trying to alleviate
this challenge. One of the most popular solutions is clustering.
Typically in clustering, the nodes are divided into some groups
as clusters, and some nodes are elected to play the role of head
of each cluster. Operations in clustering algorithms for WSNs
are usually divided into three phases [1]: CH election, cluster
formation, and data transmission. Clustering has many benefits
for WSNs, including scalability, reduced routing delay, and
topology management. Numerous techniques have been used
in this respect, including heuristic algorithms and Fuzzy logic.
Among them, Game Theory needs more attention, in light of
its strong abilities in modeling distributed systems interactions.
Game theory is a strong framework with a set of mathemat-
ical tools to study the complex interactions among intelligent
rational players [2]. Introduced by John von Neumann, modern
game theory is broadly utilized in many sciences, including
economics, politics, biology, and computer science. In game
theory, each player has a set of choices, and it is assumed
that each player plays rationally and selects the best strategy
according to the outcome function (payoff or utility). In
general, games could be divided into two groups: cooperative
and non-cooperative. In non-cooperative games, each player
plays individually and opts decisions to maximize its utility.
On the other hand, cooperative games give this opportunity
to players to create coalitions and prefer the network-wide
utility to individual utility. Basically, it has been shown that
coalitional games has a better performance in group formation
than non-cooperative games [3].
In this paper, we adopt coalitional games for WSNs in
order to form energy-efficient coalitions. Initially, the network
area is divided into two regions: far and vicinity. In the far
region, a set of nodes with the highest residual energy, called
Coalition Head Nominees (CHNs), initiate cooperative games
within their surroundings. Then, CHNs along with two other
nodes shape final coalitions. On the other hand, in the vicinity
region, some small coalitions are formed to tackle the energy-
consuming data relaying task. The Shapley value is chosen as
the solution concept for coalitional games. The remaining of
this paper is outlined as follow. Section II provides a state-
of-the-art survey on game-theoretic clustering algorithms for
WSNs. Section III details preliminaries. Section IV describes
proposed CGTC algorithm in detail. We present the simulation
experiments in section Section V, and the paper is concluded
in section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Recently, a few clustering algorithms based on game theory
have been developed and could generally be classified into:
cooperative and non-cooperative clustering algorithms. DE-
GRA [4] is a non-cooperative clustering algorithm in which
a finite complete and perfect information game is employed.
The payoff of each player consists of three factors, namely
the residual energy of the node, the consumed energy of the
node’s neighbors, and the node density. In GTC [5], game
theory is used in order to tune the cluster sizes. More precisely,
operations in GTC is segmented into two phases: the load-
balancing algorithm and cluster formation. Firstly, the network
area is segmented into some squares. Then, the width of each
square is determined via game theory in order to equalize
the load among all CHs, considering the fact that there is
exactly one CH in each square. In [6], the transmission load
assignment in WSNs is modeled as a game. In the method,
transmitting merely one packet to the base station (BS) suffices
to trigger the response of surveillance system, and authors try
to determine which sensor is going to do this, in order to fairly
balance the load among all nodes. In general, since each node
tries to individually achieve a better payoff, non-cooperative
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games seem not to be the best match for group formation
purposes.
On the other hand, quite few clustering algorithms based
on cooperative games have been proposed in recent years. In
CGC [7], a cooperative clustering algorithm is proposed for
WSNs with the objective of maximizing the network lifetime.
The wisdom behind CGC is to consider the trade-off between
individual and network-wide costs. Formed coalitions consider
the number of cluster members, the redundant energy, and
the transmission energy. The Shapley value is chosen as the
solution that assigns a single cost allocation to the cost sharing
game. Nonetheless, initial candidate selection in CGC is partly
random. Moreover, direct communication with the BS dimin-
ishes the scalability of CGC. We compare the performance
of our algorithm with that of CGC in section V. Similarly,
CSGC [8] presents a bi-directional cooperative clustering
model, where cluster members cooperate in inter-cluster and
intra-cluster transmissions. Both methods uses a cost-sharing
game in order to select Coalition Heads (CHs). Moreover, [9]
employs a coalitional game in heterogeneous WSNs. In the
method, a small number of nodes with increased computing
power and lifetime (called representatives) is employed as
the controllers of coalitions. Besides, an adaptive clustering
scheme is proposed in which neighbors of representatives form
coalitions in order to increase energy efficiency at the cost
of controllable data-accuracy reduction. However, supporting
heterogeneity and strong nodes is not practical in all setups.
Overall, none of above works solves the hot-spot problem,
which is caused due to overloading nodes close to the BS.
III. PRELIMINARIES
We consider a network of n nodes that are deployed in an
area of m×m. The BS is located at a point far from the field.
The nodes positions follow a uniform random distribution so
that we have
n = λ|a| = λm2, (1)
where λ is the node density. Both the BS and nodes are
stationary, and the nodes are not equipped with the GPS
receivers. All sensor nodes have the same capabilities and
can use different power levels to communicate with other
nodes. The network operation is divided into rounds, at first of
which coalitions are formed and then data is disseminated to
the BS through multi-hop paths among CHs. In-network data
aggregation is applied to eliminate redundant sensor reports.
In CGTC architecture, the network area is divided into two
general regions: far and vicinity. This division is adopted to
solve the hot-spot problem, and we provide more details on
this in section IV.
The model for energy dissipation is derived from the radio
model proposed in [10]. Accordingly, the energy needed to
transmit a l-bit packet to distance d is,
et =
{
l(eel + fsd
2) d ≤ d0,
l(eel + mpd
4) d > d0,
(2)
where eel is the electronics energy, fs and mp are the ampli-
fier energy of free space and multi-path models, respectively,
and d0 =
√
fs/mp. Also, to receive a l-bit packet a node
consumes
er = leel. (3)
Considering N as the set of all players, any coalition
S ⊆ N stands for an agreement among players. Moreover,
v indicates the worth of a coalition in a game. Accordingly, a
coalition game is defined as follows.
Definition 1. A coalitional game is defined by the pair (N , v),
where N is the set of players, and v is the mapping function
that determines the payoffs of players.
The mapping function v, also called characteristic function,
is defined as v : 2N → R and satisfies v(∅) = 0. Coalitional
games have two popular solutions: the core and the Shapley
value. In light of problems of the core solution [2], we use the
Shapley value. Due to the low space, we suffice to give the
alternative interpretation of the Shapley value and the curious
reader is referred to [11,12] for more investigation.
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S |!(N − |S | − 1)!
N ! [v(S∪{i})−v(S)], (4)
where φ is the payoff assigned in the game (N , v), φi(v) is
the payoff assigned to player i, and |S | is the cardinality of S .
Since, in this paper, we mainly focus on the cost games, we
use c instead of v and all concepts can easily be interchanged.
The cost of each coalition is proportional to the amount
of energy consumed by the coalition. The consumed energy
at each node has a direct relationship with receiving a bunch
of data and transmitting it over a distance. Depending on the
location of nodes (i.e., located in the far or vicinity regions),
the consumed energy is different. Accordingly, the cost of a
coalition located in the far region is computed by
c(Sf ) =
∑
i∈Sf
cchi +
∑
j∈Sf
cnchj , (5)
where cchi(Sf ) is the consumed energy by a CH in coalition
Sf and is
cchi(Sf ) = lk(eel + eda + µ(eel + fsd2)), (6)
where eda indicates the energy dissipated for data aggregation,
k is the number of coalition members assigned to CHi, and µ
is the aggregation coefficient. Note that here d is the distance
between a CH and its next-hop CH and could be d4 if the
distance is greater than d0, based on Eq. (2). Moreover, cnchj
is the energy consumed by a non-CH node in coalition Sf
and is achieved by
cnchj (Sf ) = l(eel + fsd2). (7)
On the other hand, the cost of a coalition in the vicinity region
is proportional to the amount of energy all ordinary nodes
located within the same coalition spend to relay the received
data. Thus,
c(Sv) =
∑
i∈Sv
coni , (8)
and
coni(Sv) = lη(eel + eel + fsd2) = l(2eel + fsd2), (9)
where η denotes the number of far coalitions select this
coalition as their next-hop.
IV. DETAILED CGTC ALGORITHM
In this section, we elaborate CGTC algorithm. Basically,
coalition formation in the far region is performed with the
objective of data gathering and transmitting to the BS. On
the other hand, in the vicinity region, coalitions are formed
in order to appropriately handle the data relying task imposed
by farther coalitions. Note that the area division is performed
once at first of the network deployment by the BS through
broadcasting a REG-DEC message throughout the network.
We first explain coalition formation in the far region.
A. Far Region Coalition Formation
Our main objective of coalition formation is energy effi-
ciency so the remaining energy plays a crucial role in selecting
CHs. At the beginning of each round, nodes broadcast a
CHN-INF packet containing some information, including the
residual energy (Eres), the number of neighbors (node degree,
Dn), and the proximity to the BS (di,bs), within their coalition
range (Rc) and wait for a predefined time (Tc), which is a
function of Rc. Having waited for Tc and received the packets
from neighbors, each node either selects itself as the CHN
based on the highest residual energy or remains the ordinary
node, noting that ties are randomly broken in the first round.
When CHNs are elected, they select at most two other nodes
in order to constitute their coalitions. CHNs select two nodes
with the highest Dn or smallest di,bs as other head of each
coalition. To do so, the CHN unicasts a CH-REC packet to
potential CHs. The condition for cooperation is that the initial
cost of the CHN should be reduced. In other words, if there
is a node, e.g. A, in the Rc of the CHN, it cooperates with A
if φCHN + φA < c({CHN}), where c({CHN}) is the cost
of coalition when S = {CHN} and is computed by Eq. (5).
Note that each node computes its share by Eq. (4). Therefore,
the final successful coalition in this example has three CHs,
i.e., S = {CHN,A,B} (see Fig. 1).
Elected as CHs, head nodes broadcast an advertisement
message CH-ADV within their Rc and invite ordinary nodes to
become their coalition members. On receiving this message,
each non-head node sends a JOIN-REQ message to the nearest
head node based on RSSI. After this, CHs establish a TDMA
protocol and send time schedules to their members.
Once coalitions are formed, data should be transmitted to
the BS periodically. To do this, multi-hop paths should be
established among CHs. Unlike traditional clustering algo-
rithms, there are up to three CHs within each coalition so
that the routing latency significantly diminishes. The routing
task in our scheme is so easy. Within each coalition, each CH
transmits its data to the CH that has a smaller di,bs. Then, last
CHs of each coalition transmit their data to the closest CHs
of the next coalition toward the BS. Lastly, the data reaches
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Fig. 1. Intra- and inter-coalition communications in coalitional architecture
of CGTC.
the vicinity region and is relayed to the BS. Fig. 1 illustrates
this context.
B. Vicinity Region Coalition Formation
In the vicinity region, there is no CH and boundary nodes
usually start the game. When boundary nodes receive data
from far coalitions, they calculate the cost of direct transmis-
sion to the BS. Then, they select up to three nodes, preferably
with high Eres, and check the condition of cooperation,
explained in the previous subsection. Note that since the
defined cost is in fact the energy consumed by a coalition,
if nodes that join the coalition has a higher Eres than the
node starting the game, this extra energy is subtracted from
the coalition cost, which is computed by Eq. (8). Note also that
nodes’ priority in the vicinity region is data relaying task. This
decided in order to compensate the imposed data overhead and
to solve the hot-spot problem.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the results of our experiments through
extensive simulation are given
A. Simulation Setup
CGTC is simulated using MATLAB. Two different node
densities are studied: λ1 = 0.01 (n = m = 100) and λ2 =
0.005 (n = m = 200), based on Eq. (1). The BS is located
at (m + 50,m/2) and the node positions follows a uniform
random distribution. We take the duration of each round to be
equal to five data gathering epoch. Also, we do not consider
packet losses and we assume that all messages are successfully
received by their destinations.
We compare CGTC with two baseline clustering algorithms,
namely LEACH [10] and CGC [7]. LEACH is the popular
clustering protocol that utilizes random CH election. Gener-
ally, we have picked the parameter settings that yield the best
performance for baseline algorithms. In particular, for both
competing algorithms, depending on the node density, we have
the CH election probability p ∈ [0.05, 0.1]. Other simulation
parameters are summarized in Table I. The individual results
are the average over 20 runs and the length of each run is
6000 rounds. When subjected to 95% confidence interval the
results stayed within 6-10% of the sample mean.
B. Simulation Results
In this subsection, we report the results of simulation.
Fig. 2(a) compares the network lifetime of the three algo-
rithms for λ1. As shown in the figure, CGTC significantly
outperforms the two competing algorithms in terms of the
network lifetime. While in CGTC there are more than 80% of
nodes alive until round 3000, the majority of nodes (around
60%) die before rounds 1500 and 2500 in LEACH and CGC,
respectively. This is mainly because CGTC forms suitable
coalitions, picks nodes with appropriate parameters values as
heads, as well as solves the hot-spot problem. Among baseline
algorithms, CGC has a better condition due to employing
coalitional games and taking residual energy into account for
CH election; however, the algorithm still suffers from random
candidate election. Moreover, it adopts direct communication
between CHs and the BS so energy consumption climbs.
Fig. 2(b) illustrates the energy-efficiency for λ2, which
significantly affects the performance of the two baseline al-
gorithms. As shown, the number of alive nodes in LEACH
quickly drops to less than 20, and all nodes die before round
2000. In CGC, after a dramatic decrease in the number of alive
nodes, it experiences a less sharp decline and reaches zero
before round 2500. In contrast, more than half of the nodes
are alive in CGTC until round 3500. Overall, yet the network
scales grow, CGTC has a good performance, in terms of
energy efficiency, and significantly outperforms two baseline
algorithms.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed CGTC, a Coalitional Game-Theoretic
Clustering algorithm for sensor networks, whose main objec-
tive is energy-efficiency. Initially, the network area is divided
into the far and vicinity regions. Then, depending on the lo-
cation of nodes, different coalitions are formed. Basically, the
residual energy plays a significant role in shaping coalitions.
The Shapley value is used as the solution of coalitional games.
The results of simulation shown that CGTC considerably
outperforms competing algorithms CGC and LEACH.
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TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Scenario 1 Scenario 2
n 100 200
m 100 200
λ 0.01 0.005
BS (150,50) (250,100)
fs 10pJ/bit/m
2 10pJ/bit/m2
mp 0.0013pJ/bit/m
4 0.0013pJ/bit/m4
eel 50nJ/bit 50nJ/bit
eda 5nJ/bit/signal 5nJ/bit/signal
Rc 20m 20m
µ 0.5 0.5
Initial Energy 1J 1J
Data Payload 100Byte 100Byte
Header 2Byte 2Byte
Trailer 1Byte 1Byte
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Fig. 2. Network lifetime comparison among three protocols.
